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RECENT DECISIONS
courts, perhaps influenced by the fact that a common law right of
privacy was denied in New York," have been loath to extend a rem-
edy to any situation other than those which fall within the confines
of the statute.1 2  The decision in the instant case is another indica-
tion of that tendency towards restrained judicial interpretation of the
statute.
CONFLICT OF LAws-DomEsTIc RELATIONS-JURISDICTION TO
AWARD CUSTODY WHERE CHILD IS TEMPORARILY OUTSIDE STATE.-
Plaintiff and defendant were domiciled in Ohio. As a result of in
personam proceedings instituted in that state, plaintiff was awarded
temporary custody of her minor child, ancillary to a final decree of
divorce. The child had been sporadically cared for by the paternal
great-grandfather in Pennsylvania, and was in fact sent there four
days before the divorce action. The Ohio decree provided that the
child continue his residence in Pennsylvania, but expressly reservedjurisdiction to subsequently relitigate the issue of custody. Six
months later the plaintiff was awarded exclusive custody of the child
by the Ohio court. Prior thereto, the defendant had taken up resi-
dence with his child in Pennsylvania where the plaintiff now insti-
tutes habeas corpus proceedings. The trial court refused to grant
custody to the plaintiff in the interest of the child's welfare. The
Superior Court reversed, holding that the Ohio decree was entitled
to full faith and credit. Held, judgment reversed. The decree of
the Ohio court need not be accorded full faith and credit since the
foreign court had no jurisdiction over the child, who was residing in
Pennsylvania at the time the decree was awarded. Commonwealth
ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 80 A. 2d 829 (Pa. 1951).
There has developed a sharp divergence of judicial opinion con-
cerning the jurisdictional requirements necessary to empower a court
to award custody of minor children. Some courts have designated
residence of the child within the state as the criterion.' It is rea-
691 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295
N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
"1 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442(1902).
12 Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913); Humiston
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp. 752 (Ist
Dep't 1919); Wallach v. Bacharach, 192 Misc. 979, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 37 (Sup.
Ct.), affd inem., 274 App. Div. 919, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 894 (1st Dep't 1948);
Wilson v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Swacker
v. Wright, 154 Misc. 822, 277 N. Y. Supp. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Jeffries v.
N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N. Y. Supp. 780 (Sup.
Ct. 1910).
I Thrift v. Thrift, 54 Mont. 463, 171 Pac. 272 (1918) ; Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925); Ritchison v. Ritchison, 28 Tenn. App.
432, 191 S. W. 2d 188 (1946).
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soned that the courts wherein the child is physically present, are
better adapted to ascertain present conditions affecting the child's
welfare.2  However, there is substantial authority adhering to the
proposition that the state of the child's domicile may properly exer-
cise its judicial power to award custody, notwithstanding the court's
failure to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the child.8 Some of
these latter authorities may be construed as actually requiring cus-
tody proceedings to be brought in the place of the child's domicile. 4
The theory advanced is that custody being a matter of the child's
status, adjudication thereof is a proceeding in rem, cognizable only
in the state of the child's domicile.6 This artificial concept frequently
gives rise to the problem of determining the child's domicile at some
precise time," inasmuch as a minor child is incapable of changing his
domicile by his own act.7
The great weight of the decisions emphasize the inherent power
of a court to regulate custody as an incident to a matrimonial action
where both litigants have personally submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court.$ The rule prevails without regard to the
technicalities of the child's domicile or residence.9 The rationale of
these cases seems to be that when a court acquires jurisdiction over
the parties and the status of the marriage relation, it necessarily ac-
quires jurisdiction over the status constituted by the relation between
the parents and minor children.10
The New York courts have consistently held the child's resi-
dence within the state sufficient," and his presence before the court
2 Matter of Meyer, 209 N. Y. 59, 102 N. E. 606 (1913). Cf. People
ex rel. Noonan v. Wingate, 376 Ill. 244, 33 N. E. 2d 467 (1941); Sheehy v.
Sheehy, 88 N. H. 223, 186 Atl. 1 (1936).
3 Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606 (1930) ; State ex rel. Larson
v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 252 N. W. 329 (1934).
4 RESTATFMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934). "A state can exercise
through its courts jurisdiction to determine the custody of children . . . only
if the domicil of the person placed under custody . . . is within the state."
5 Forkner v. Forkner, 215 P. 2d 482 (Cal. 1950); Person v. Person, 172
La. 740, 135 So. 225 (1931); Daugherty v. Nelson, 234 S. W. 2d 353 (Mo.
1950).
6 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1934). "... a minor child
has the same domicil as that of its father." Id. § 32. "The minor child's
domicil, in case of divorce or judicial separation of its parents, is that of the
parent to whose custody it has been legally given; if there has been no legal
f xing of custody, its domicil is that of the parent with whom it lives, but if
it lives with neither it retains the father's domicil."7 Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933).
8 Dolgoff v. Dolgoff, 80 Cal. App. 887, 183 P. 2d 380 (1947) ; Talbot v.
Talbot, 120 Mont. 167, 181 P. 2d 148 (1947); State v. Rhoades, 29 Wash.
61, 69 Pac. 389 (1902).
9 See note 8 supra.
10 State v. Rhoades, supra note 8; Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va. 124, 81
S. . 706 (1914) ; see note 2 supra.
"Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925) ; Forbell v. For-
bell, 276 App. Div. 785, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (2d Dep't 1949); People ex rel.
Billotti v. New York Juvenile Asylum, 57 App. Div. 383, 68 N. Y. Supp. 279(1st Dep't 1901).
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requisite,12 to the court's assumption of jurisdiction to award cus-
tody. The domicile of the parents 13 or of the child 4 are not con-
trolling factors, for the court may act as parens patriae to do that
which is best for the child's interests.15 In New York, the issue of
custody may be raised as an incident to a divorce action,16 by a peti-
tion to a court of equity,17 or by a separated spouse in a habeas corpus
action.' 8
Perhaps the most controversial phase of custody awards con-
cerns their finality, and the related problem of their extra-territorial
effect. Cognizant of the universal principle that the ultimate concern
is the child's welfare,' 9 the numerical weight of the decisions con-
sider a custody award interlocutory in nature, and res judicata only
as long as the conditions upon which it was predicated have not
changed. 20 If the child's welfare demands, the court, in exercising
its inherent power may modify its initial decree relating to custody,
despite the fact that the parent or the child may have subsequently
removed themselves from its territorial jurisdiction.2 '
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently been called
upon to determine to what extent, if any, the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution 22 requires recognition of custody decrees
of sister states. In the leading case of New York ex rel. Halvey v.
'12 People ex rel. Winston v. Winston, 31 App. Div' 121 52 N. Y. Supp.
814 (1st Dep't 1898) ; cf. Matter of Meyer, 209 N. Y. 59, 68, 102 N. E. 606,
609 (1913). "If an order relating to custody of an infant is to be of any
value the infant must be within the power and control of the court."1 3 Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925).
14 Forbell v. Forbell, 276 App. Div. 785, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (2d Dep't 1949).
15 Hill v. Hill, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
IS N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 1140. "If a marriage be declared a nullity or
annulled, the court, . . . must give such direction for the custody and care
of any child of the marriage, . . . as justice requires."
17 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAv § 70. "A husband or wife, being an inhabitant
of this state, living in a state of separation, without being divorced, who has
a minor child, may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus
to have such minor child brought before such court; and on the return thereof,
the court, on due consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge
and custody of the child to either parent . ..:'
'Is Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925).
19 Cassell v. Cassell, 52 So. 2d 918 (Miss. 1951); State er rel. Day v.
Parker, 55 N. M. 227, 230 P. 2d 252 (1950); Sandfort v. Sandfort, 105
N. Y. S. 2d 343 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1951).
20 In re Leete, 205 Mo. App. 225, 223 S. W. 962 (1920) ; Talbot v. Talbot,
120 Mont. 167, 181 P. 2d 148 (1947); State ex rel. Nipp v. District Court
of 10th Judicial District, 46 Mont 425 128 Pac. 590 (1912).
21 Baily v. Schrader, 34 Ind. 260 (1870); Stetson v. Stetson, 80 le. 483,
15 Atl. 60 (1888) ; Hersey v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 171 N. E. 815 (1930);
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 1140.
22 U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State." 62 STAT. 947, 28 U. S. C. § 687 (1948) provides: "Such Acts, rec-
ords and judicial proceedings . . . shall have such faith and credit given to
them in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State . .. from which they are taken."
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Halvey,23 the Court emphatically sustained the applicability of the full
faith and credit clause to foreign custody awards. It stressed the
view, however, that subsequent modifications thereof by the court of
the forum, based on changed conditions affecting the child's welfare,
would not necessarily violate the constitutional provision.
24
The court, in the instant case, was constrained to effectuate the
Ohio decree unless changed conditions affecting the welfare of the
child since the date of its rendition obviated its modification.2 5 The
refusal to recognize the decree of a court having in personam juris-
diction over the litigants, in the state of the parties' domicile, was
contrary to the weight of authority.2 6
M
CONFLICT OF LAWS- PUBLIC POLICY- ENFORCING FOREIGN
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE.-Decedent, a resident of Wisconsin,
was fatally injured in an automobile accident in Illinois. Plaintiff
administrator brought an action in Wisconsin predicated upon the
Illinois wrongful death statute.' The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that Wisconsin's own wrongful death act 2 announced a public
policy against the trial of causes based on the death acts of other
states. Plaintiff contended that this construction of the Wisconsin
statute violated the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal
Constitution.3 Held, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court is
the final arbiter, in each case, of competing public policies. Wis-
consin's statutory policy must give way to national policy as expressed
in the "full faith and credit" clause. Hughes v. Fetter, 71 Sup. Ct.
980 (1951).4
The mandate of the "full faith and credit" clause has felt the
effect of a number of important judicial limitations. Ordinarily, a
state is not required to enforce the law of a sister state if it is penal
23 330 U. S. 610 (1947).
24 Since the court rendering the original decree has the power to modify
its decree on the finding of changed conditions, the court of the forum, by
its modification on the same basis, would not be doing anything the original
court could not do.
25 The reason for this rule is made apparent in the light of the possible
harm to the child and to the prestige of Courts of Justice resulting from any
other rule.
26 See notes 7, 8 supra.
I ILL. REV. STAT. c. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1949).
2 This statute, textually similar to many wrongful death acts, concludes:
"Provided, that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this state."
Wis. STAT. § 331.03.
3 U. S. CoNsT. Art IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts . . . of every other State."4 Reversing Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 42 N. W. 2d 452 (1950).
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